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TORTS-PUNITIVE DAMAGES-ALLOWED IN MARYLAND FOR
WANTON DISREGARD OF HUMAN LIFE. SMITH V. GRA Y CON-
CRETE PIPE CO., INC., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972).
In Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co.,' plaintiffs brought an action as
administrator and parents for the wrongful death of their minor son.
The son was killed when his automobile collided with a truck entrusted
to Edwards by his employer, the Gray Concrete Pipe Co., Inc. Edwards
was an eighteen-year-old laborer who possessed no chauffeur's license
and who had no experience in operating this type of truck. Indeed, his
only experience in operating any type of vehicle had resulted in three
traffic violations. The truck entrusted to Edwards was in an unsafe
condition, manifesting fifteen violations of the Interstate Commerce
Commission safety regulations. Edwards drove this truck upon a high-
speed, limited-access highway. In the course of this trip a piece of wire
which secured the hood of the truck separated, causing the hood to rise
up and completely obstruct the vision of the driver. In response to this
emergency Edwards, at once and without warning, steered the truck
into one of the high-speed lanes of the three lane highway and stopped.
Decedent's automobile collided with the rear of the truck, and he was
killed.
The action was brought in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. That court certified to the Maryland Court
of Appeals the question of whether punitive or exemplary damages
might be had under the laws of Maryland in automobile tort cases.
Before reaching the question certified to it, the Court of Appeals dealt
with three procedural issues raised by the defendants: whether the
court had proper jurisdiction of the subject matter; whether the deci-
sion of a lower Maryland court (where the action was originally
brought) sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff's prayer for exemplary
damages was res judicata, and whether the administrator of a decedent's
estate was a proper party to recover exemplary damages.
The Smith court held that it had proper jurisdiction as opposed to
the Court of Special Appeals when considering questions certified to it
under the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act.2 The ques-
tion of res judicata was dismissed because the plaintiffs had assented to
1. 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972).
2. Smith involved the first question to be certified to the Maryland courts under the Uniform
Certification of Questions of Law Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, §§ 161-72 (1972). The de-
fendants contended that the case should not have been certified to the Court of Appeals
but rather to the Court of Special Appeals. Their argument was based on the statutory
provisions which grant initial appellate jurisdiction in tort cases to the Court of Special
Appeals. MD. ANN. CODE art. 5, §§ 5A(16), 21 (1968). To allow certification to the Court of
Appeals was said to be inconsistent with these provisions. In rejecting the defendants' con-
tention, the court reasoned that the legislative purpose underlying the Act was to obtain
a speedy and final determination of Maryland law on the question certified. Because the
Court of Appeals was the court best able to make such a determination, the court con-
cluded that it should have initial appellate jurisdiction of certified questions. 267 Md. at
154-55, 297 A.2d at 724-25.
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a voluntary nonsuit in the lower court before entry of final judgment.3
In holding for the first time in Maryland that an administrator was a
proper party to recover exemplary damages, the court reasoned that:
"[I] f the wrongdoer may be punished if his victim lives, then he surely
should not escape retribution if his wrongful act causes death." 4
Upon consideration of the certified question, Smith held that ex-
emplary damages could be recovered in automobile tort cases. Because
the driver (Edwards) had merely shown poor judgment in exigent
circumstances, punitive damages were not assessable against him.' On
the other hand, the conduct of the Gray Concrete Pipe Co. in entrust-
ing the defective truck to Edwards was of a character to support an
award of punitive damages.6
Although Smith is the first case in Maryland to fully delineate the
granting of punitive damages in an automobile case, the concept of
exemplary damages is not new. It was considered as early as 1817 in the
case of Pratt v. Ayler,7 where the court allowed punitive damages as
"additional punishment" for the tortfeasor. The test applied in all of
the early cases considering exemplary damages for tortious acts' was
one of actual malice or evidence which gives cognizance to that mal-
ice.9
In the early case of Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R.R. v.
Hoeflich,' 0 the court, in reversing an award of punitive damages, held
that the test applicable for the award of such damages was that of
fraud, malice or evil intent.' ' The Hoeflich rule has been applied to a
large number of cases covering the full range of tort actions,' 2 and has
resulted in the denial of exemplary damages when the plaintiff has been
unable to meet the heavy burden of proving actual malice, wantoness,
animosity or ill will.' '
3. 267 Md. at 155-58, 297 A.2d at 725-26. The Smith court observed that the circuit court
proceeding was neither part of the record of the instant case nor within the certification,
and thus was not properly before the court. However, the court decided the issue anyway,
concluding that "an order sustaining a demurrer is not a final judgment" and, therefore,
the doctrine of res judicata was not applicable. Id. at 157, 297 A.2d at 726. See also State
for Use of Staylor v. Jenkins, 70 Md. 472, 17 A. 392 (1889).
4. 267 Md. at 159-60, 297 A.2d at 727, quoting from Leahy v. Morgan, 275 F. Supp. 424, 425
(N.D. Iowa 1967).
5. 267 Md. at 171, 297 A.2d at 733.
6. Id. at 171-72, 297 A.2d at 733-34.
7. 4 H.&J. 349 (Md. 1817).
8. See Byers v. Horner, 47 Md. 23 (1878); Barton Coal Co. v. Cox, 39 Md. 1 (1873); Moore v.
Schultz, 31 Md. 418 (1869); Shafer v. Smith, 7 H.&J. 67 (Md. 1826).
9. Shafer v. Smith, 7 H.&J. 67 (Md. 1826).
10. 62 Md. 300. 50 Am. Rep. 223 (1884).
11. Id. at 307, 50 Am. Rep. at 224.
12. See, e.g., Summit Loans, Inc. v. Pecola, 265 Md. 43, 288 A.2d 114 (1972) (invasion of pri-
vacy); Drug Fair, Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971) (assault and false impri-
sonment); Nichols v. Myer, 139 Md. 450, 115 A.2d 786 (1921) (trespass).
13. Associates Discount Corp. v. Hillary, 262 Md. 570, 278 A.2d 592 (1971) (trespass);
Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970) (interference with contract); Dennis
v Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 (1948) (assault); Baltimore Transit Co.
v. Faulkner, 179 Md. 598, 20 A.2d 485 (1941) (assault and battery); Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
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The first Maryland case dealing with the question of punitive dam-
ages in automobile tort actions was Davis v. Gordon."4 In Davis two
pedestrians were struck by an automobile while walking on the shoul-
der of a highway. Davis was injured and his companion was killed by
the car, which was operated by the defendant who was driving at an
excessive rate of speed and without a license. After striking the two
men, the defendant fled the scene of the accident.' ' Reversing the
lower court, the Court of Appeals denied punitive damages, using the
same test as was used by the Hoeflich court: "[T] o entitle one to such
damages there must be an element of fraud, or malice, or evil intent, or
oppression entering into and forming part of the wrongful act."'
' 
6
Further, the Davis court implied that exemplary damages should not be
granted where the imposition of a criminal punishment would fulfill the
same punitive purpose.' 7
Several years after Davis, the court in Conklin v. Schillenger' 8
expressed a willingness to apply exemplary damages in an automobile
case where gross negligence was present, but this opinion was by way of
dicta, as the court held that the issue of recoverability of punitive
damages was not properly before it." 9 As in Smith and Davis, the
factual situation before the Conklin court, as considered in the dicta,
was one in which the evidence did not indicate actual malice or intent
to injure. The Conklin court stated:
We think it is clear that none of the decisions in this Court
has held that in no conceivable set of facts there may not be a
recovery of punitive damages in a tort case seeking damages for
personal injuries resulting from the use of automobiles, and the
opinion in Davis suggests that there may be recovery of punitive
damages in the event of an intentional, malicious injury in
automobile cases. The difficulty in the Maryland cases arises in
regard to factual situations in which there is no evidence of
actual intent to injure or of actual malice toward the injured
person, but in which the defendant's conduct is of such an
extraordinary character as possibly to be the legal equivalent of
such actual intent or actual malice, sometimes described as
Boyd, 63 Md. 325 (1885) (trespass); Philadelphia, Wil. & Balto. R.R. v. Hoeflich, 62 Md.
300, 50 Am. Rep. 223 (1884) (assault).
14. 183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699 (1944).
15. While flight from the scene of an accident is not generally considered to be negligence, the
plaintiffs argued that it should be considered to show the reckless state of mind of the de-
fendant. Id. at 133-34, 36 A.2d at 701. In many states flight coupled with other negligent
acts has been a key element in an award of punitive damages. See, e.g., Smith v. Mc-
Nulty, 293 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1961). The Court of Appeals in Davis rejected this element.
183 Md. at 134, 36 A.2d at 701.
16. 183 Md. at 133, 36 A.2d at 701.
17. Id. The implication was rejected sub silentio in Smith. Not only did the court allow puni-
tive damages contrary to that theory, but also it adopted the same test for awarding such
damages as the court has used for defining gross negligence in criminal prosecutions for
automobile manslaughter. See p. 161 infra.
18. 255 Md. 50, 257 A.2d 187 (1969).
19. Id. at 76, 257 A.2d at 200.
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"wanton," "reckless disregard of the rights of others," and the
like. We rather agree that in this latter type of situation, the
language of some of the Maryland cases needs further interpre-
tation and possible reconsideration to reach a more clear-cut
rule, but unfortunately the present case is not one in which we
can accomplish this desirable result .... 0
In Smith the court obviously found an occasion for such further
interpretation or reconsideration. In establishing a standard for measur-
ing conduct sufficient to allow an award of punitive damages, the court
relied on the Conklin dicta and the cases defining gross negligence in
criminal prosecutions for automobile manslaughter.' ' The test was:
We regard a "wanton or reckless disregard for human life" in
the operation of a motor vehicle, with the known dangers and
risks attendant to such conduct, as the legal equivalent of
malice. It is a standard which, although stopping just short of
wilful or intentional injury, contemplates conduct which is of
an extraordinary or outrageous character.2 2
The court implied that the adoption of that test would confer a dual
benefit. First, because it had been frequently applied in the automobile
manslaughter cases, the standard was a familiar one.2 3 Secondly, the
strictness of the criminal standards would limit the application of the
rule.2 4 To further emphasize its apparent intention to limit recovery of
punitive damages, the court adopted a strict rule of pleading. In future
actions, the court indicated, the facts giving rise to a claim for punitive
damages must be specified in the pleading with particularity.2 5
For the first time in Maryland the Court of Appeals has authorized a
recovery of punitive damages in an automobile tort action. In so doing
the court set aside the old, stricter requirement of actual malice as a
condition to such an award and substituted for it the more liberal
requirement of conduct equivalent to imply malice. That conduct was
defined as "a wanton or reckless disregard for human life." Despite the
20. Id. at 71, 257 A.2d at 198.
21. See, e.g., Romanesk v. Rose, 248 Md. 425, 237 A.2d 12 (1968).
22. 267 Md. at 168, 297 A.2d at 731-32.
23. Id. at 168, 297 A.2d at 732.
24. Prior to discussing the new standard the court stated: "[Wle perceive from some of the re-
ported decisions the danger of formulating a test which may be so flexible that it can be-
come virtually unlimited in its application." Id. at 166, 297 A.2d at 730-31. Compare that
statement with the court's later comment: "And if, as a test, it has been regarded as
adequately stringent to serve as a basis for possible imprisonment, then, surely, there
appears to be no valid reason for deeming it too liberal for imposing civil sanctions." Id.
at 168, 297 A.2d at 732.
25. The court phrased the requirement as follows:
No bald or conclusory allegations of "wanton or reckless disregard for human life,"
or language of similar import, shall withstand attack on grounds of insufficiency. It
follows from what we have said that far greater specificity will be required than
that reflected by the "Appendix of Forms" accompanying the Maryland Rules.
Id. at 168, 297 A.2d at 732.
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assertion of the majority that the new test was consistent with the old
standard,2 6 Smith is a clear departure from the old rule.2  The new
rule brings Maryland within the growing majority of states which allow
punitive damages in automobile tort actions.2 8
Lawrence D. O'Neill
26. "The problem.., is in fashioning a test which does not depart from our prior decisions .... "
Id. at 165, 297 A.2d at 730.
27. In his dissenting opinion Judge Smith criticized the majority thusly: "To me it is clear that
the existing rule does not permit recovery of punitive damages under the facts set forth
in this declaration. Therefbre, if the law is to be changed, it should be done by the General
Assembly." Id. at 174, 297 A.2d at 735.
28. Id. at 163-65 n.3, 297 A.2d at 729-30 n.3.
